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RESUMEN 
 
Este trabajo llamado “Nuclear Disarmament and Non Proliferation: A view to posible 
changes” que traducido significa “Desarme y No Proliferación de Armas Nucleares: 
Una mira a posibles cambios” es resultado de una extensa investigación sobre este 
tema relevante en el espectro internacional. Se enfoca en torno a la pregunta de cuáles 
podrían ser las posibles medidas para hacer que el régimen de desarme y no 
proliferación sea efectivo y el objetivo de eliminar las armas nucleares en el mundo 
pueda ser alcanzado. La investigación incluye una revisión de los instrumentos 
internacionales que son parte del régimen de desarme así como de las instituciones que 
trabajan en el tema. Así también se revisa el rol que ha tenido el Consejo de Seguridad 
en el tema hasta ahora y la elaboración de un estudio de caso basado en Irán para 
demostrar la aplicabilidad de la normativa en este sentido y los problemas que se han 
encontrado. Finalmente se provee un análisis profundo de los espacios donde se puede 
tomar medidas para mejorar el sistema en pro de alcanzar el objetivo de desarme con 
el fin de contestar la pregunta y dar algún tipo de solución a los problemas que se 
analizan a lo largo del documento. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
This paper called “Nuclear Disarmament and Non Proliferation: A view to possible 
changes” is a result of a wide investigation about this relevant topic in the 
international scope. It focus on the question of what could be the possible measures to 
make the disarmament and non-proliferation regime effective and reach the goal of 
eliminating nuclear weapons in the world.  The investigation includes a revision of 
international instruments which are part of the disarmament regime as well as from the 
institutions that address the issue. It also revise the role that the Security Council has 
had in the topic until now and the elaboration of a case study based in Iran in order to 
demonstrate the applicability of normative in this sense as well as the problems that 
appear. At the end, the paper provides a profound analysis of the spaces where 
measures can be taken to improve the system in order to reach the disarmament 
objective with the aim of answering the question and provide a possible solution to the 
problems that are analyzed throughout the document.  
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 1. Introduction 
Different areas are involved in international politics, like economic power, diplomacy, 
government ideology and lately even environmental issues. Nevertheless, military power has 
been present in international relations since the world was divided in empires. The importance 
of each empire was determined by the number of soldiers they had as well as the strategies 
they used which in compound can be defined as military power. During the birth of nations, 
the military was fundamental to define nation’s borders and how the world would be divided 
geopolitically. This element was key in both World Wars held in the 20
th
 century to define the 
winners with a clear influence on what we have as an international system nowadays. In the 
21
st
 century, military power is still dominant when speaking of international relations even 
though tendencies go towards pacific settlement of disputes but the risk of military 
confrontations is always present. 
On that note, the development of powerful and innovative weapons has been crucial in 
government’s policies. These policies were developed in the constant risk that states believe 
they are due to potential armed conflicts and the subsequent necessity of “being secure.” 
Security has always been stick to how armed a country may be with the ineludible 
consequence of a race between actors in the international arena to determine who has the most 
weaponry or who has the weapon that will damage the most to the enemy. In this regard, 
weapons like the bow and arrow, bayonet, grenades, tanks, explosives, chemical weapons, 
napalm, among others are examples of how countries have worked hard to develop the most 
destructive devices to eliminate enemies. In this desire, humans developed weapons that are 
able not only to eliminate enemies but to affect dozens of generations and some would say 
that these devices can eliminate any kind of life over the earth when talking about Nuclear 
Weapons. 
 
 The process of developing Nuclear Weapons cannot be defined as its creation was 
rather circumstantial. Other kind of experiments was developed when the reaction of certain 
components brought interesting outcomes. Away from giving technical explanation of how 
nuclear weapons work, the most relevant fact in these explanations is that Nuclear Weapons 
exist and if used, humanity could see their last days of existence. In the wake of this potential 
holocaust, disarmament and non-proliferation became a recurrent topic of discussion in 
international politics forums in order to explore solutions to this progressive problem.  
For this cause, it is imperative to explore the ways that the world addresses such a 
threatening problem. In this regard, the detailed analysis of the Nuclear Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation regime is crucial to intend to understand the framework in which states are 
involved around nuclear arms. In this sense, the institutions that deal with the topic related 
crisis are the corner stone in the focus of this investigation which is: Which are the 
possibilities of having a nuclear disarmed world and what measures should be taken to  
achieve this goal in the international system? Along the paper, some hints may appear to 
answer the question, but the complexity of the framework is the challenge to develop ideas on 
how is it possible to make countries deny themselves the possibility of having weapons that 
would assure their victory over enemies but will also ensure their own destruction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Background 
 Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is a complex topic that has been a high 
priority on the international agenda since the first nuclear weapons were used in 1945 by the 
United States in attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
1
  This was obviously an out 
breaking sign of alarm to the whole world when verifying that one bomb could disappear a 
whole city with everything in it. In the Co-chairs’ Preface of the 2009 Report of the 
International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament, which is 
an Australian and Japanese governments initiative, stipulated that: 
The nuclear problems the world has to address are immensely large, complex and 
difficult. Every state with nuclear weapons has to be persuaded to give them up. States 
without nuclear weapons have to neither want nor be able to acquire them. Terrorists 
have to be stopped from buying, stealing, building or using them. And in a world 
where, for good reason, the number of power reactors may double in the next twenty 
years, the risks associated with purely peaceful uses of nuclear energy have to be 
effectively countered.
2
 
This statement completely summarizes the essence of the problem what should be the  
world´s aim related to this as the risk of possible use of these devices becomes larger and 
larger due to the international context.  
At this stage, it is important to differentiate between nuclear disarmament, arms 
control, and nuclear non-proliferation. Nuclear disarmament is the removal and elimination of 
existing nuclear warheads.
3
 Arms control is the regulation of the commerce and trespassing of 
weapons, or the reduction without elimination of nuclear stockpiles.
4
 Finally, nuclear non-
proliferation involves the prevention of new nuclear weapon states and also the cessation of 
new production of warheads.
5
 This differentiation is necessary as this kind of problems derive 
in several others that may also make the solution diffuse and deviate from the root problem. In 
                                                          
1 Stimson, The decision to use the Atomic Bomb,1947. p. 1. 
2 Evans and Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats. 2009. p. ix..  
3 Damrosch, Banning the Bomb: Law its limits, 1986. p.654. 
4 Arms Control Association, 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011_01-02/Index  
5 Damrosch, Banning the Bomb: Law its limits, 1986. p. 655. 
 this case, disarmament is the root solution to the Nuclear Weapons problem with an important 
component on non-proliferation to avoid future problems and having as a consequence the 
elimination of the need for arms control. In this sense, the Canberra Commission, which is an 
independent commission created by the Australian government in order to stop the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, made clear that so long as any state has nuclear weapons, 
others will want them; so long as these kinds of weapons still exist, it remains unknown if 
they will be used again; and any such use would be catastrophic for the world as we know it.
6
 
Twenty three years after the end of the Cold War, which was the historical context in 
which these devices proliferated after their appearance in World War II, there were at least 
23,000 nuclear warheads still in existence, with a combined capacity equivalent to 150,000 
times average the power of the weapon used in Hiroshima.
7
 These numbers may seem crazy 
but this is as much states care about their security and about how this stockpiles would 
ameliorate other states from attacking them. In the international context, there are states who 
are permitted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to have nuclear weapons. From 
these states that have this “adavantage” the United States and Russia together have over 
22,000 warheads (which is understandable due to the weapons race held during the Cold War 
between these two powers) while France, the United Kingdom, China, India, DPRK, Israel 
and Pakistan possess around 1,000 warheads between them.
8
 These numbers are extra official 
as countries like DPRK, Israel and India claim that they don’t have nuclear weapons but are 
not part of the nuclear regime while the risk of conflict with these countries is high. 
Furthermore, nearly half of all warheads are still operationally deployed, and the US and 
Russia each have over 2,000 weapons on high alert, ready to be launched immediately.
9
 This 
numbers are overwhelmingly high and analysts assure that these reserves would be enough to 
destroy the world several times if used.  
                                                          
6 The Camberra Commission in the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. http://www.ccnr.org/canberra.html. 
7 Evans and Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats,2009. p. xviii. 
8 Evans and Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats,2009. p. xvii. 
9 Evans and Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats,2009. p. xvii. 
 Since 1945, the international community has been developing ideas and concrete 
measures to prevent states from having nuclear weapons and a regime that would limit those 
who were permitted.
10
  In the need of concrete measures, for many years, nuclear non-
proliferation arrangements revolved around two treaties: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) 
Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
11
 One of the options was clearly the 
agreements between states to avoid the possibility of having a conflict and having stockpiles 
of nuclear weapons. The ABM Treaty became this option real and consisted in bilateral 
treaties that the United States promoted. Nevertheless, this treaty failed since the United 
States withdrew from it, rendering it inactive and leaving an enormous empty space regarding 
the capability of states to commit into an agreement that would keep them from having 
nuclear weapons. The other option was a multilateral attempt that would create a normative 
they would bind states to accorded rules between them and that´s how the NPT was created 
even though now is considered as a controversial treaty, therefore has enormous pressure over 
it.
12
  While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global non-
proliferation regime, it is clear that the regime has a wider range, as a large and growing 
number of inter-related and mutually reinforcing legal instruments, institutions, programs, 
initiatives, and arrangements that complement the NPT and its associated International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system.
13
 Most of these resources work under the 
same objective which is to diminish the probabilities of a nuclear war even if in some areas 
these overlap and at the same time lose legitimacy. 
3. Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime 
There are several instruments in the international framework regarding nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament even though not all of them work but try to address the 
                                                          
10 Stimson, The decision to use the Atomic Bomb, 1947. p. 1. 
11 Lodgaard, The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2008. p. 1. 
12 Lodgaard, The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2008. p. 1. 
13 Falk, Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter, 1997. p. 66. 
 different areas of impact that this already industry has produced worldwide. Of these 
instruments, there are two that have an important weight in the international structure 
regarding this topic: the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the proposed 
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).
14
 These contain specific measures focused on 
securing nuclear weapons, materials, and technology from potential terrorists and state 
carriers as well as reducing proliferations risks.
15
   
In addition, the Nuclear Suppliers Group is another initiative as well as the 
Proliferation Security Initiative.
16
  The Nuclear Suppliers Group was founded in 1974 in 
response to the Indian nuclear test of that year, and it works as the informal arrangement of 46 
nuclear supplier states that seeks to prevent, through the coordination of national export 
controls, the transfer of equipment, materials and technology that could contribute to nuclear 
weapons programs in states other than those recognized as nuclear-weapon states in the 
framework of the NPT.
17
  As a consequence of this initiative the Security Council, in 
Resolution 1172, provided a waiver to India in order to allow them make negotiations with the 
NSG under safeguards which was a very polemic action due to the interests that were crashed 
to Pakistan as the first enemy of India.
18
 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was 
launched by the United States in May 2003, with the purpose of interdicting ships, aircraft, 
and vehicles suspected of carrying nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic 
missiles, and related technologies from exporting and importing countries that are under 
suspicion of proliferation.
19
 This measure was one of the desperate measures ordered by 
former President George W. Bush as one of the points in his strategy to tackle terrorists. So 
far, there is no evidence that any terrorist group in the world have a nuclear device or even 
                                                          
14
 Kwang Teo and Atsushi Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p.2. 
15
 Kwang Teo and Atsushi Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p.2. 
16 Lodgaard, The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2008. p. 5. 
17 Lodgaard, The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2008. p. 5. 
18 Peace Now: 2008, 2008. p.47.  
19 Lodgaard. The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 2008. p. 5. 
 have the capability to build one but the main objective of this initiative was to prevent 
terrorists from acquiring such a destructive measure. The apparition of this measure brought a 
new problem to the table which was that countries, in order to be secure, had to sacrifice their 
liberty. This concept was not well received by the majority of the international community 
and the initiative did not have the impact expected by the United States. Nonetheless, there is 
still no definite measure that would establish contingence if a terrorist group acquire a new 
weapon.  
Moreover, there are two other instruments that have even less influence than the 
previous ones but still have their relevance. One of the most relevant areas inside Nuclear 
Weapons is the materials needed to develop a warhead. The risk of terrorist acquiring these 
devices was already identified when the worry of non-state actors having these weapons 
appeared. In the wake of this situation, it was imperative to develop the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material created in 1987 and its 2005 amendment which 
includes security measures to avoid the acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists.
20
 Thus it 
has no real scope of action as no terrorist groups have acquired this weaponry but the policies 
of prevention may be qualified as successful due to this fact. Furthermore, there are other 
security and arms control arrangements, including efforts to curb missile proliferation like the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which is an association of countries that want 
to achieve non-proliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of 
mass destruction.
21
 However the actions that this regime impulse is not tangible, therefore it 
has been widely ignored and has no influence on the issues that come up every year regarding 
the global problem. 
It is clear that these resources have not been the most recorded and have the most 
efficiency addressing the goal of nuclear disarmament but they constitute the structure of the 
framework that was built to regulate this kind of arsenal. In addition to these resources, there 
                                                          
20 Lodgaard. The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2008. p. 5. 
21 Lodgaard. The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 2008. p. 5. 
 is one that has the largest importance in this issue and is a special example of an international 
instrument that has had a partial success on binding states to its claims. This instrument is the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which is a controversial document but succeed on imposing 
measures to a great quantity of countries. However, due to those countries that did not abide 
to its normative, its legitimacy and validity is being discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most widely ratified arms control and 
non-proliferation treaty, with 189 states party.
22
 After a decade of negotiation beginning in the 
                                                          
22 Kwang Teo and Atsushi Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p.1.  
 late 1950s, the treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.
23
 This 
alternative came up as a great opportunity to control countries in their aim of arming 
themselves to protect from their enemies.  In this regard, one of the most relevant topics is the 
issue of non-proliferation to states recognized by the treaty as non-nuclear, including all states 
other than China, France, Russia, the UK, and the United States.
24
 This differentiation has 
brought huge debates on how unfair it is for the controlled states for other “VIP” states that 
are allowed to manage this kind of weaponry. However, the debate is useless as these were 
the WWII winners and their legitimacy has been proven by the United Nations to which every 
nation in the world is signatory and it implies preferential benefits to these countries.  
Furthermore, the great challenge established in the treaty resides in preventing non-nuclear 
weapons states (NNWS) from acquiring nuclear technologies.
25
 A third area of application, 
which is not contained in the NPT but its concept has been largely developed in this area, is 
that of the countries that already possess nuclear technology but do not have nuclear weapons 
and are characterized as the potential Nuclear Weapons States or threshold states, which 
actually are the ones that represent the most immediate and imminent threat when analyzing 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
26
 Threshold states are the largest potential risk to 
the whole Nuclear Disarmament regime and in situations like the recent problem in Libya 
lead to the idea that the world is not secure with these instruments and that it depends on the 
decision of one bad dictator if we survive or not.  In this category there are several states 
contemplated such as: Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, South Africa, Iran, Libya, Taiwan, Japan, 
Australia, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Netherlands, among others.
27
 Argentina became a risk to 
international security when the war with United Kingdom was held due to the inequality of 
                                                          
23 Kwang Teo and Atsushi, Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p. 1.  
24 Kwang Teo and Atsushi, Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p. 4.  
25 Kwang Teo and Atsushi, Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported. 2005. p. 5. 
26 Evans and Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, 2009. p. 50. 
27 Evans and Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, 2009. p. 51. 
 conditions between them and the possession of nuclear technology by Argentina. Iran is a 
case that in these days brings uncertainty to the whole regime and the rest of the world and 
it’s a case that will be explained afterwards. The volatility of a leader like Muammar Al-
Qadaffi was a constant threat to the aims of the NPT specially on the whole story on how it 
acquired nuclear technology from France in a negotiation with terrorists situation. The case of 
Taiwan is also a potential risk as its rivalry with China could derive in a difficult 
confrontation. All other countries do not represent a risk and historically never did but that 
does not mean they won’t have a conflict and they won’t have the option of developing 
nuclear weapons.  
In this context, it is crucial to revise the articles provided in the instrument in order to 
define its importance as well as its flaws on how can it be improved.  Articles I and II of the 
NPT prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons technology from a NWS to a NNWS, while 
Article IV liberates accepted nuclear weapons states from these restrictions on acquisition.
28
 
However the case of France and the transference of nuclear technology to other countries like 
Libya broke these precepts and became an exception that brought polemic as well. Article III 
limits proliferation by requiring all NNWS to be subject to inspections of their nuclear 
facilities by the IAEA to ensure transparency in all nuclear-related activities.
29
 As all NNWS 
agreed on this clause, it’s not refutable on how unfair is this disposition, however as NWS has 
compromised themselves to reduce their arsenal, this article should contain a disposition 
claiming the revision of these reductions as well.  Non-nuclear weapons states, which were 
asked to join the NPT and thus voluntarily give up their right to acquire nuclear weapons, 
acquired something in return in Article VI, which asks all signatories of the NPT, NWS in 
particular, to work towards universal nuclear disarmament.
30
 Nevertheless, these claims have 
stayed in paper as gradually NWS have developed or acquired even more weapons than 
                                                          
28 Beckman, Crumlish, Dobkowski and Lee, The Nuclear Predicament, 2000. p. 222. 
29 Beckman, Crumlish, Dobkowski and Lee, The Nuclear Predicament, 2000, p. 222. 
30
 United Nations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968, Article VI.  
 before and bilateral treaties such as START have been acts of good faith but not effective for 
disarmament purposes.  The treaty also promotes the creation of regional nuclear-free zones 
in Article VII which is a great possibility towards disarmament as when countries from same 
realities agree on complete disarmament can be more sustainable than agreements between 
countries that do not share principles which are the case between occidental and oriental 
cultures.
31
  Article IV reaffirms the right to develop, research, and use nuclear energy 
purposes, as well as exchange equipment, materials, and scientific information, for peaceful 
purposes.
32
 This has been the Damocles Sword in this context as countries that are suspect of 
having a nuclear program to develop weapons, when investigated, claim that their program is 
created for peaceful purposes. This was the case of North Korea who ended up resigning to 
the treaty and it’s the current case with Iran that claims its innocence on developing nuclear 
weapons and ratifies the pacific purposes of the nuclear program. 
In addition to the previous, this instrument also provides review conferences every five 
years in which consensus is needed to take decisions; so far, there have been six review 
conferences in order to revise, amend, and strengthen treaty requirements and discuss 
potential challenges.
33
 This represents a great opportunity every five years as this treaty is the 
most accepted and where more countries can participate in order to develop possible 
improvements to the whole regime. These challenges have included the pursuit of complete 
nuclear disarmament by states that already possess nuclear weapons designated as “nuclear 
weapons states” (NWS).34 Regardless of this objective, the status of NWS will not change as 
it’s not of their interest to change that disposition. Also, the reductions of existing stockpiles 
and nuclear testing prohibitions by the NWS are a topic of importance at these review 
conferences bearing in mind that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is a clear 
                                                          
31
 United Nations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968, Article VII. 
32 United Nations, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968, Article IV.  
33 Kwang Teo and Atsushi, Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005, p. 1. 
34 Kwang Teo and Atsushi, Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p. 2. 
 example of this.
35
 However, as stated before, the mentioned treaty and other attempts to 
reduce the stockpiles have been more than a failure as a reduction of armament in comparison 
to other countries would definitely mean a reduction of power. The first review conference of 
the NPT was held in 1975 and focused on addressing the continuing arms race between the 
Soviet Union and the United States.
36
 The review conferences that were held from 1975 until 
1990 focused fundamentally on the need to halt the arms race between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, as well as the need for recognized nuclear weapon states to reduce their 
stockpiles as required under Article VI of the NPT.
37
 This fact demonstrates that the regime is 
not working appropriately as the United States and the former Soviet Union, the Russian 
Federation, have not reduced their armament making Article VI of the Treaty a black hole in 
the regime and some would even say in international law. 
The last Review Conference was held in 2010 and there were huge expectations to what 
major changes or discussions would go on in this event. The 2010 Review Conference’s 
largest controversy was over the proposal to hold a Middle East conference in 2012, with the 
aim of establishing a regional zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
38
 
Over the years, this goal has become one of the priorities due to the volatility of possible 
conflicts in this area. There is a persistent risk in the Middle East even though there are no 
declared conflicts currently as the menace of a frontal war between Iran and Israel is high. 
The issue here is not that these countries would not be attacking just each other as for sure, 
many countries in the region would intervene so a regional conflict would be the terrible 
outcome. In this matter, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, together with United Kingdom, 
Russia, and the United States, was designated to declare a host government for the conference 
and appointing an actor to facilitate preparations for the conference and consult with relevant 
                                                          
35 Kwang Teo and Atsushi, Incentives and Disincentives for Accession into the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Why is Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Globally Supported, 2005. p. 4.  
36 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Compliance and growth - NPT review conferences, 2004.  
37 Nuclear Threat Initiative, Compliance and growth - NPT review conferences, 2004. 
38 Johnson, R. Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 2. 
 governments to analyze the steps to take towards the event.
39
 The site for the conference was 
decided to be in Helsinki; however the tough situation in the Middle East between Israel and 
several countries has brought the idea that countries want to delay the conference for late 
2012 or even 2013. Regarding disarmament and safeguards, the conference faced difficulties 
in making any concrete commitments which has been the common outcome of most Review 
Conferences.
40
 The majority of states party in the conference supported past commitments, 
commended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and expressed support 
for efforts to ratify and bring the CTBT into force and both are weak decisions that do not 
bring nothing new to the regime and reinforce the apathy of states on the treaty.
41
 
Nevertheless, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) was still not developed as well as 
any mention to more commitments from Nuclear Weapons States to disarm.
42
 Even though 
fissile material is one of the most important areas to take care of in this topic, countries do not 
develop a clear route to address it. Furthermore, one of the strongest reasons why the treaty 
has lost its strength and legitimacy, was not addressed and just solidified the fact that NWS do 
not want to reduce arsenal or even worse, disarm.  Some of the most important topics to be 
treated were: “proposals to delegitimize nuclear weapons and reduce their role in nuclear 
doctrines; opposition to the modernization of nuclear weapons systems; and the need for 
comprehensive negotiations on some kind of nuclear abolition treaty.”43 In addition, new 
proposals from the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) concentrated in diminishing and 
eliminating nuclear weapons.
44
 The Additional Protocol, which is a safeguard device created 
in 1997 after the discovery of Iraq´s nuclear program, could not be established as a 
verification standard or a condition of supply and it was not possible to renew the consensus 
on the understanding agreed in 2000 that this protocol is an integral part of the IAEA 
                                                          
39 Johnson, R. Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011 p. 2. 
40 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 3.  
41 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 3. 
42 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 3.  
43 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 5. 
44 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 7. 
 safeguards system.
45
 Finally, there was no progress on the crucial issues of the nuclear 
programs of Iran and North Korea, the nuclear arsenals of India, Pakistan, and Israel, and 
countries that violate or attempt to withdraw from the treaty.
46
 This last fact bring small hope 
to the international community and the solution is just to press countries to reach to new and 
renovated changes to the treaty or soon it will be useless.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
The International Atomic Energy Agency was the institution that countries thought would 
be the most appropriate to be in charge of verifying that countries are complying with the 
existing regime. The IAEA is guided by its Statute, which was adopted unanimously by 81 
original Member States on October 23, 1956.
47
 In this regard, this instrument has been 
amended three times, in 1969, 1973, and in 1989 due to the current need that at those times 
                                                          
45 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 7. 
46 Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, 2011. p. 9.  
47 IAEA, Statue of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 1956.  
 were important for member states.
48
  The initial inspiration to found the Agency was based on 
a speech given by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1953 bearing in mind that was one of the promoters of having a regime to 
control such dangerous devices.
49
 This intervention is better known as the “Atoms for Peace” 
address, where Eisenhower proposed the creation of an international body that would regulate 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in his quality as President of the major power that the 
world had in those days.
50
 
The IAEA is officially an independent body from the United Nations; however, it entered 
into a formal relationship with this organization with an agreement adopted in 1959 that was 
needed in order to avoid overlap between both institutions and work in coordination to reach 
better results.
51
 Under this agreement, the IAEA reports annually to the General Assembly 
and also reports to the Security Council on matters of international peace and security, as well 
as on a case-by-case basis when an IAEA member state is in non-compliance with its nuclear 
safeguard obligations.
52
 These interventions have covered more importance with time as the 
IAEA has become vital in important crisis where the biggest fear was a possible nuclear war 
or at least the use of one over a population causing huge damage to everything on it.  
In this regard, there are three defining areas of nuclear cooperation that guide the work of 
the Agency: “Safeguards and Verification; Safety and Security; and Science and 
Technology.”53 To fulfill the objectives of Safeguards and Verification, the Agency oversees 
inspections of nuclear facilities to ensure that known safeguarded nuclear materials are not 
used for military means which is the most important role of the IAEA in relation to non-
proliferation.
54
 In relation to nuclear Safety and Security, the Agency works to protect people 
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 from exposure to radiation by establishing international norms and guidelines for ensuring the 
security of nuclear materials and facilities.
55
 In this context, the IAEA has failed to 
accomplish its precepts as the disasters in Chernobyl of the 80´s and the recent catastrophe in 
Japan represent the flaws of the system. These flaws are evident most of all in the cases of 
crisis and the lack of contingence plans to manage crisis like the detailed before. Moreover, 
the Agency assists States in implementing these guidelines and assists in improving their 
ability to respond to emergencies that may come up from a nuclear casualty; nevertheless this 
is just trespassing knowledge end not effective assistance from the Agency to the country that 
is suffering the terrible consequences of an accident of this nature.
56
 The third pillar of the 
IAEA’s work, nuclear Science and Technology, consists of encouraging and assisting states to 
increase their use of nuclear technology in the fields of health, energy, agriculture, and the 
environment.
57
 There is a huge debate around this pillar as showing the benefits of acquiring 
nuclear energy would impulse countries to develop it. That, naturally is not wrong, the 
problem is that countries that do not have the capability to manage it in a sustainable way can 
derive in terrible accidents or even worse, it is easier to develop weapons that if not managed 
appropriately could cause even worse outcomes. 
The IAEA structure is composed of three main bodies that direct the Agency’s 
activities: the General Conference, the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat.
58
 The General 
Conference contains all 150 IAEA Member States and meet annually, to examine and approve 
current Agency projects, approve budget, and to entertain matters that the Board of Governors 
suggest to this body.
59
 This instance is clearly a great forum to propose changes in the 
institution in a way that would contribute to the great objective of disarmament. Moreover, 
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 the General Conference also has the duty to approve the Director-General.
60
 For instance, the 
Board of Governors is a body of 35 Member States who meet five times a year at IAEA 
headquarters; this organ has to present the General Conference with budgetary and program 
matters, approve safeguard agreements, and nominate the Director-General to the General 
Conference.
61
 Even though this organ doesn’t have the democratic essence that it should due 
to its importance in decision making, its relevance relies on the scope of power that this organ 
has inside the regime. The IAEA Secretariat consists of a multidisciplinary support staff that 
helps achieve the challenges and activities of the Agency, led by the Director-General and 
including inspectors, nuclear experts, nuclear engineers, and managerial staff.
62
 This staff is 
not enough to cover the necessities in emergency cases for which one of the recommendations 
to strengthen the framework would be to augment personnel in order to widen the support that 
can be provided to member states. 
Currently, the IAEA’s primary non-compliance concerns are the nuclear programs of 
Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Iran has not shown evidence that it has 
suspended its enrichment-related activities or its heavy water programs.
63
 Additionally, Iran 
did not cooperate with the Agency’s inquiries into the possible military purposes of its nuclear 
program based on their argument of the peaceful nature and purposes of the program.
64
 In the 
case of DPRK, the state doesn’t cooperate with the IAEA at all since there is no binding 
commitment from the country to this organ but it is the only organ that can legally make 
inspections regarding nuclear activities in any country.
65
  
The link between the NPT and the IAEA is extremely strong and works based on the 
needed coordination due to the circumstances in which both work. While the NPT constitutes 
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 the framework for disarmament measures, it is the responsibility of the IAEA to verify the 
NPT compliance by inspecting and monitoring the activities of Member States that utilize 
nuclear technology, in order to verify that the technology is being used for peaceful 
purposes.
66
 To comply with its responsibility, the IAEA has three types of safeguard 
agreements: comprehensive safeguards agreements, item-specific safeguards agreements, and 
voluntary offer agreements.
67
 In Article III of the NPT, all NNWS states party must create 
comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA which cover all of the declared nuclear 
activities within a State that can be inspected and monitored by the institution. The item-
specific safeguard arrangement covers only certain nuclear activities within a state which are 
under the jurisdiction of the IAEA.
68
 These kind of safeguards exist; however can be 
improved in most of the cases. Currently the IAEA has item-specific safeguards agreements 
with India, Pakistan and Israel, all of which are states that have not signed onto the NPT and 
are therefore free from safeguards agreements.
69
 These safeguards are symbolic and represent 
the discourse that these countries want to project as they do not accept they have nuclear 
weapons so they don’t receive sanctions, but at the same time have their own nuclear agenda 
without any specific control that would stop them from using or proliferating this kind of 
armament. Voluntary offer agreements are primarily undertaken between the IAEA and 
nuclear weapons states, since under the terms of the NPT, nuclear weapons states are exempt 
from comprehensive safeguards agreements.
70
 This constitutes a serious problem for countries 
that are confined by the safeguards that Nuclear States don’t which is a serious violation to 
the principle of equity. However, countries have already accepted those terms in the treaty but 
that does not exclude the clear situation of deterioration that this framework is living 
currently. 
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6. Role of the Security Council 
  Within the powers and responsibilities of the most important organ in international 
security and peace is the fact of addressing those elements that constitute a threat and would 
endanger life in the planet.  The role of the Security Council regarding Nuclear Disarmament 
and Non-Proliferation has not been constantly active; nevertheless the United Nations Charter 
in its 26th Article delivers the responsibility of promoting disarmament to this organ.71  In this 
regard, it is important to point out that the Council in its fundamental mandate of addressing 
threats and breaches to international peace and security acted in Israel´s nuclear programs in 
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 1981, Iraq´s nuclear program from 1991 to 2007, nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, 
Iran´s non-compliance to IAEA´s mandate in 2006, among others.72  It is important to point 
out that the Security Council intervention has been fundamental in cases where the world was 
facing a threat related to dangerous armament for conflicts.  In this context, heads of state in a 
Council meeting in 1992 determined that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation 
is a threat to international peace and security opening the possibility of acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter if an event of this nature appears in the international scope.73 This decision 
was ground breaking and set a key precedent to the goal of disarmament.  Under this premise, 
the Council acted under Chapter VII in 2004 through S/RES/1540 requiring all states to 
establish controls over WMD and the means to deliver them and to enact and enforce the 
necessary national implementing legislation with the objective of prohibiting terrorists and 
other non-state actors from developing, acquiring and using these kinds of weapons.74  Even 
though, critiques argue that this kind of measures came up when the United States was a huge 
victim of terrorist attacks and decided to declare war on terrorism, it was an important step 
attack one of the main risks of the existence of nuclear armament in the world.  
  A crucial year regarding the role of the Security Council in this topic was 2009 due to 
various events. The United Kingdom came up with a new initiative on nuclear disarmament as 
well as France will to reduce its nuclear arsenal.75  United States President, Barack Obama, 
stipulated its will to reduce the country´s stockpiles in order to work towards a world free 
from Nuclear Weapons as well as its posterior agreement with Russia in the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty.76 Sadly, these intentions do not project in reality as the international 
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 community expects and have done nothing to make those expectations true through the 
Security Council for obvious reasons. 
  One of the areas that the Security Council has taken action is the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by Non State Actors and S/RES/1373 adopted in 2001, after the terrorist attacks in 
the US, was the first action in this sense.77  Other area where the Security Council has 
intervened is the Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapons States through S/RES/255 
adopted in 1968 and S/RES/984 adopted in 1995 in order to secure Non-Nuclear State when 
being threatened or in conflict with a Nuclear Weapons State.78  Furthermore, the Council has 
acted regarding the establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones through S/RES/1170 
accepting the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty.79  In this same sub topic, the 
Council has worked in terms of establishing nuclear weapons free zone in Middle East 
through: S/RES/687 adopted in 1991 which took Iraq´s actions as a step towards a nuclear 
weapons free zone; S/RES/1284 passed in 1999 with the creation of UNMOVIC in order to 
achieve the goal of a Middle East free from nuclear weapons; and S/RES/1747 passed in 2007 
as well as S/RES/1803 adopted in 2008 which were worked to solve Iran´s situation and 
maintaining the prime objective of establishing a nuclear weapons free zone in Middle East.80  
As a matter of fact, Syria presented a draft resolution in 2003 towards a nuclear free zone in 
this region but it was never put to vote due to a lack of support by P-5 members.81 This case is 
just a glimpse of the obstacles and limitations that important decisions confront in important 
forums such as the Security Council due to independent agendas and political interests from 
member states, especially P-5 members. 
  Moreover, the Security Council participated in several events that came up to the attention 
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 of the Council.  In 1981, the Council adopted S/RES/487 regarding Israel’s attack against the 
Osirak reactor and emphasizing the recognition to the right of all states, especially developing 
countries, to establish programs of peaceful nuclear development.82  In the context of the 
Democratic People´s Republic of Korea crisis of 1993, the Council passed SC/RES/825 
affirming the importance of the IAEA safeguard agreements for the implementation of the 
NPT.83  In the wake of the India and Pakistan crisis the Security Council, through 
S/RES/1172, embraced the NPT and CTBT emphasizing Article VI of the NPT regarding the 
commitment of the five nuclear-weapon states on nuclear disarmament.84  With the prevailing 
crisis in Iran, the Council adopted S/RES/1737 in 2006, S/RES/1747 in 2007, and 
S/RES/1803 in 2008 where it stipulated its commitment to the NPT and recalled the right of 
state parties to acquire nuclear power for peaceful matters.85 All of these have contributed to 
small achievements in the fight for disarmament and non-proliferation but don’t have a 
tangible change that would embrace an advance in this objective. 
7. Study Case 
Due to the complexity of the topic, there are several cases to analyze as circumstances 
where the regime has been proven to function or not. Iran, for instance, is a particular case 
where the country has not satisfied the International Atomic Energy Agency need for it to 
collaborate.
86
 The IAEA has done innumerable attempts to work with the country and at the 
same time trying to do its work. Iran has not accepted to all the interventions and has 
defended its sovereign right to maintain information in confidentiality.  Its nuclear program is, 
according to the Iranian government, for peaceful objectives while a part of the international 
community argument that this program is doubtful and has a high risk of becoming a program 
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 that develops nuclear weapons.
87
 Nevertheless this can also be guided by the image that some 
countries have projected by Iran like Israel or the United States. On the other hand, Iran´s 
premier has done efforts to make the international community believe he is a conflictive 
leader for declarations such as “Israel should disappear from the world map.” The case of Iran 
is interesting as it’s not a case that just popped up but it has several years present in the 
international topics and its interesting how recently it has become a priority in the 
disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. 
Even though Iran has proven to avoid the international instruments regarding Nuclear 
Weapons, Iran signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1968, ratified it in1970, and 
since February 1992 has allowed the IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities even though Iran 
already signed the Safeguards Agreement in 1974.
88
 Its signature and ratification is a symbol 
of good faith by the authorities of Iran historically. In addition to this, the IAEA released the 
Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, in 1997, which Iran signed in 2003 but has 
not ratified until now.
89
 This signature could be vital in order to revert all the polemic about 
nuclear armament in the country as is one of the reasons why international community 
suspects that its nuclear program is not for pacific purposes.  
Simultaneously, Iran´s nuclear program has 55 years of history. In 1957, the United 
States and Iran accorded a civil nuclear cooperation agreement which included technical 
assistance and the lease of enriched uranium to Iran.
90
  Ten years later, Iran opened a nuclear 
research center sponsored by the United States with a research reactor.
91
 In 1974, Iran had its 
first two nuclear energy reactors in Bushehr sponsored by a private German firm.
92
  
 Nevertheless, these reactors had to suspend its construction and they were bombed during the 
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 Iran-Iraq war leaving them totally destroyed.
93
  Until 1978, Iran tried to negotiate with United 
States in order to have enough capacity to exploit nuclear energy; however politics inside the 
US stopped the negotiations due to the fact that authorities considered inconvenient for Iran to 
have this kind of energy.
94
  That year, an agreement was reached between both nations in 
order to guarantee high enriched uranium fuel to Iran.
95
 
  After 1979, when the revolution in Iran was held, the nuclear activity was stopped due 
to the energy supply cut by the United States.
96
  Six years later, Iran and China established 
nuclear relations and China provided a training reactor in order to reactivate nuclear activity.
97
  
An important agreement with Argentina was signed in 1987 related to the enriched uranium 
supply which was fundamental for Iran´s nuclear program process.  Subsequently, in 1990, 
Iran reconstructed the Bushehr nuclear plant and in 1992 Iran signed a crucial agreement with 
Russian Federation in order to build a new nuclear power plant.
98
  It was in 1998 that Iran´s 
nuclear program started to become doubtful as the rates of other types of energy in Iran were 
understood as enough to satisfy the country´s needs as well as Iran´s interest to develop a 
second power plant sponsored by Russia in 1999.
99
  United States former President, Bill 
Clinton, signed the Iran Nonproliferation Act in which the US would punish any nation or 
institution that provides any kind of nuclear assistance to Iran.
100
  Nonetheless, Russia and 
Iran reached to an agreement of nuclear and military cooperation speeding the nuclear 
process.
101
 
The year 2003 was the turning point in which Iran started to depend on itself to 
develop nuclear energy as they discovered uranium in their territory.
102
 In this regard, the 
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 preoccupation about Iran´s nuclear program grew but their discourse was that it was for 
peaceful means and even supported a proposal made by Syria to eliminate weapons of mass 
destruction in the Middle East.
103
  The IAEA reported that Iran was not violating the NPT in 
2003
104
 however; there were findings of highly enriched uranium later on but with the 
intervention of United Kingdom, France and Germany, Iran committed to suspend uranium 
enrichment.
105
  After various advances in the process, Iran signed the Paris Accord with the 
three European countries assuring that Iran will not pursue nuclear weapons notwithstanding 
the fact that they have the right to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
106
   
The relation between Iran and the IAEA was not fluent and US former President Bush 
considered initiating a conflict with Iran in 2005 but an agreement with Russia to control the 
use of uranium fuel again calmed the tension.
107
  This same year, the IAEA urged Iran to stop 
all enriching activities as it found non-compliance actions by Iran to the Safeguards 
Agreement directing the situation to the Security Council.
108
 The Security Council took action 
and under Resolution 1696 demanded Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities with 
possible contingence if they not complied with the decision.
109
  This measure was effective 
for instance, however Iran reactivated its program and the US signed an Act to impose 
economic sanctions to any actor that cooperated with Iran´s nuclear program.
110
  In that 
regard, due to the lack of Iran´s compliance, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 
which froze Iran´s authorities’ assets.111  This measure was strengthened by Resolution 1747 
from the Security Council which forbids arms exchange with Iran.
112
  In this sense, in 2008, 
the Security Council approved Resolution 1803, which imposed further economic sanctions 
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 on Iran with their ratification in Resolution 1835.
113
  In 2010, due to the progress of Iran 
uranium enriching program, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1929 which imposed a 
fourth round of sanctions on Iran imposing financial sanctions and expanded arms embargo 
but it had no use as well as US and European Union sanctions.
114
 In that context Russia 
announced the termination of Iran´s first nuclear power plant.
115
 
In September 2011, the Bushehr reactor was inaugurated after years of being built and 
now Iran announced the construction of a new nuclear power plant, improving its nuclear 
capacity.
116
 In November 2011, the IAEA released its report assuring that Iran has been doing 
practices of nuclear explosives and expressed its concern that Iran´s nuclear program is 
becoming a military process to which Iran rejected and hinted a possible withdrawal of the 
NPT.
117
  Finally in February of this year, the IAEA reported that Iran refuses to permit the 
Agency visit the area where there is suspicion of possible explosives and the doubts increase 
as Iran lose more credibility.
118
  The last weeks, there has been an increasing tension between 
Iran and Israel due to the supposed sponsorship from Iran to terrorist groups in the Gaza strip 
and the possibility of conflict between those nations arises.
119
 
In conclusion Iran is a good example on how the framework is failing. It is valid to 
analyze this case as it’s the perfect example on what areas should the regime be reformed and 
reinforced. Iran is one case that still has no end as the expectations are intact but the regime 
has not changed at all to turn this situation around. Even worse, this case leaves the door open 
for other countries to follow the same steps for which is necessary to create plans that would 
prevent other countries of having this practices. The bottom line is that the legitimacy of the 
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 disarmament and non-proliferation regime is in the border line and the world can easily face a 
nuclear anarchy soon with possible disastrous outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
In these days, the issue of achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is a 
challenging topic for the international community as it is vital to maintain international peace 
and security.  In this regard, it is important to highlight the relevance that this topic should 
have.  Being the Security Council the most important body when talking about security and 
peace in the world, the existence of instruments that can destroy the world in no time is a 
matter of extreme importance of the international arena.  With these facts noted, the NPT and 
the IAEA are key tools to enforce the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; however the 
role of the Security Council must be more active than its historical actions.  In order to find 
solutions it can be useful to answer the next questions: What has been the role of the 
International Community regarding the topic? Does this role have been effective through time 
in order to achieve the long term goal of disarmament and non-proliferation? Is the NPT an 
effective instrument or alternative measures should be taken? Does the functions and structure 
of the IAEA is efficient or should it have more Security Council support? Does the issue 
 needs more instruments that can norm states towards complete disarmament? What could be 
the incentives for NWS to reduce their nuclear arsenal and long term elimination? What could 
be the incentives stop NNWS from acquiring nuclear weapons? What measures can the 
Security Council take in order to impose resolutions over countries regarding this topic 
specially?  It is essential to understand that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is a 
determining factor for the present and the future security of the world, therefore for the 
prevailing peace in the international arena.  
   Throughout this document, the different scenarios where the framework regarding 
disarmament and non-proliferation can improve have been analyzed. The results are not 
very positive as there is a whole political trap around the topic but there are certainly several 
challenges and possible actions that could be done. United Nations Secretary General Ban 
Ki-moon, in his address to the East-West Institute, expressed about the future actions that 
should be taken towards disarmament saying: 
 Commence discussions, perhaps within its Military Staff Committee, on security issues 
in the nuclear disarmament process. They could unambiguously assure non-nuclear-
weapon states that they will not be the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons. The Council could also convene a summit on nuclear disarmament. Non-
NPT states should freeze their own nuclear-weapon capabilities and make their own 
disarmament commitments.120 
  The Security Council, as its clear above, has not taken substantial actions regarding 
disarmament but there are plenty of actions that it may take to do it.  In this regard, a 
possibility to strengthen its role towards the topic is to define periodic meetings and an annual 
high level meeting to follow the issues in the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
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 agenda.121 This option would provide the possibility to guarantee a constant discussion the 
highest level towards solving the issues that this topic brings even every day. Other option 
could be to establish a high-level subsidiary body to support the Council in elaborating 
substantial strategies in order to achieve the goal of disarmament and non-proliferation.122 
This option would make more sense bearing in mind that the IAEA has lost its strength and 
the Security Council has been the only organ that has taken huge but not enough steps 
towards nuclear disarmament. In that sense a new organ would not only develop its own 
agenda but will have constant contact with the IAEA and other institutions in order to 
harmonize the framework serving as coordinator of all the proposals to address this issue. An 
additional option could be to develop an omnibus Council resolution bringing together and 
updating all of the existing resolutions, statements and other decisions of the Council to date 
containing thematic outcomes on issues of disarmament, arms control and non-
proliferation.123  Nevertheless, even if a recount resolution is provided by the Security 
Council, nothing will assure to the international community that this will work better than the 
individual resolutions. The unification of all of them would make easier to refer to just one 
document rather than all the mentioned in previous chapters but they don’t take effective 
measures that would facilitate disarmament and non-proliferation in a short, mid or long term.  
Further options could be the development of plans of universalization of the NPT and the 
IAEA Additional Protocol; plans for better compliance to the NPT and IAEA Additional 
Protocol by the Council; contingence plan to NPT or IAEA Additional Protocol withdrawal; 
or leading plans for new processes for the establishment of nuclear free zones.124 All these 
plans would just reinforce the existing framework around the topic and would give an answer 
                                                          
121 Security Council Report , Cross-Cutting Report No. 2The Security Council’s Role In Disarmament And Arms Control: 
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation And Other Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 2009. 
122 Security Council Report , Cross-Cutting Report No. 2The Security Council’s Role In Disarmament And Arms Control: 
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation And Other Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 2009. 
123 Security Council Report , Cross-Cutting Report No. 2The Security Council’s Role In Disarmament And Arms Control: 
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation And Other Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 2009. 
124 Security Council Report , Cross-Cutting Report No. 2The Security Council’s Role In Disarmament And Arms Control: 
Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation And Other Weapons Of Mass Destruction, 2009. 
 to the initial thesis which is what measures should be taken to achieve the goal of 
disarmament? 
  There are too much variables in this topic that makes it really complex to solve or even 
address in an effective manner. Some would say that the long term goal of nuclear disarming 
is impossible to reach if the world powers don’t agree to do so. Some, more optimists would 
say that with time, countries will understand that having destructive devices is not beneficial 
for the planet and would abide to the existent regime. Others would say that achieving 
disarmament is a matter of enforcing the existent regime. There is no delineated path to 
follow in this topic which makes it fascinating. Nonetheless, the final conclusion is that there 
are ways to promote disarmament and non-proliferation in a sustainable and efficient manner 
but the obstacles are found in member states and their actions. So long, there are no ways to 
influence on those attitudes and the international system awaits new more rational leaders to 
come. It seems like this theory is utopic so the most viable way is to use the instruments and 
resources available towards a stronger commitment from countries to worldwide goals and 
international law. This is of extreme necessity as the future of the world resides in the same 
countries that compose it and if a new world conflict appears with nuclear armed actors 
probably the world will disappear and that is something that the international community 
should be aware of.  
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